By Daniel E. Levenson, Democracy and Security, Volume 17, 2021 - Issue 2 https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2021.1913698
It has been over a decade now since the influential Islamist terrorist ideologue and facilitator Anwar Al-Awlaki was killed by US forces, and his legacy as a propagator of particularly pernicious propaganda and source of extremist inspiration, still lives on. In both life and death Awlaki’s methods have drawn the interest of not only counterterrorism practitioners and scholars, but captured the popular imagination as well, with his apparent facility with social media combined with his command of English and the impressive, if somewhat questionable upon closer inspection, credentials, he claimed as a scholar of Islam, casting him in a unique light, effectively rendering him, at times, an object as much of fascination of scorn in the west.
This “popularity” and how Awlaki achieved, maintained, and used it to further the cause of violent jihad, is the focus of a new book by author Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, who does an excellent job of outlining the ways in which Awlaki harnessed social media and other online platforms to facilitate the spread of extremist Islamist ideology, and of terrorist violence in its name. Perhaps even more crucially, the author highlights the ways in which Awlaki is also clearly of a type, sharing both personal traits and methods with a range of other violent extremists rooted in a wide range of motivating ideologies.
An awareness of these two aspects of Awlaki’s approach is critical for understanding why he was so successful. Awlaki was both highly motivated and creative when it came to his use of technology to spread violent Islamist ideology, and at the same time, it becomes clear in the this book that the backbone of his approach rested solidly on a foundation of previously proven propaganda techniques, employed by everyone from 19th century European Anarchists to left-wing radicals in 1960’s America to the militia and white supremacist movements of the last forty years. Awlaki proved a master propagandist, concocting a seemingly coherent worldview that was a mix of historical reframing, psychological manipulation, leveraging of individuals’ search for identity, as well as collective grievance and the concept of the spectacle of the deed – the same things that facilitators of terrorism and other forms of political violence have used for more than a century to transform discontent into violence. In this sense, highly effective but hardly unique.
Meleagrou-Hitchens centers this work around an exploration of Awlaki’s personal evolution and his use of the aforementioned strategy and tactics, presenting a troubling portrait of an individual whose deadly influence has outlived his life as well as compelling lessons for both scholars and practitioners of counterterrorism. The observations shared and lessons gleaned from this book go beyond what one can say about Awlaki specifically, and provide both context and additional ways to think about the phenomena of both “radicalization” and “terrorism” in general, and with regard to the intersection of these two concepts and social media, in particular. As a result, it seems this volume is likely to remain a useful companion for counterterrorism researchers and practitioners for many years to come. Concerns around remote radicalization, for example, have become increasingly urgent, along with remote control of terrorist operatives in the field by handlers on the other side of the world.
As the author makes clear, part of Awlaki’s success is attributable to his ability to present a coherent narrative of victimhood, while also making the case for the existence of a broader war (beyond the actual battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan) between Islam and the west. This approach fits neatly into other models of manipulation in which extremist ideologues manage to tap into a vein of discontent and grievance. In fact, a number of influential scholars, including J.M. Berger, have noted the important role that grievance often plays in the radicalization process. In his seminal work, Extremism, Berger writes that, “ … extremist ideologues weld grievances to a system of meaning in which they become both universal and personal, while insisting on hostile action to resolve the conflict. This toxic worldview can then be applied to help mobilize hostile action against specific individuals or entities associated with an outgroup”Footnote1 (p. 131). As Meleagrou-Hitchens reveals, the idea of grievance and its use as a tool for manipulation and extremist recruitment, was a principle that Awlaki understood implicitly and formed the basis of his approach to recruitment.
One thing that readers may note with interest is that unlike many other Muslim extremist figures, Awlaki did not start out as part of a radical religious movement, but instead spent his formative years and established himself as a voice of authority within a relatively mainstream branch of Islam in the United States. As the author demonstrates, it was this experience, Awlaki’s time in America, combined with a seemingly innate sense of how to craft and disseminate a message anchored in the search for individual identity and group grievance, which played key role in his ability to connect with other western Muslims who may have been vulnerable, for any number of reasons, to the siren song of radicalization and subsequently terrorism. This also raises the question as to whether Awlaki’s connections to the west – he spent time in Great Britain, but perhaps specifically his American roots – could be one reason that his actions stirred such anger and fear among US leaders and the general public. After all, if one “Awlaki” could emerge from the deserts of New Mexico or the streets of London, why not two? Or three? And so on.
In terms of structure the author divides his work into two complementary sections, with the first focused on Awlaki himself, exploring some of the influences and events in his personal life which contributed to his own radicalization and how his message was both consonant with, and at times, deviant from, both mainstream Islam as well as the messaging and approach of other violent Islamist groups. In the second half of the work the author presents three case studies of individuals who took action based on the influence of Awlaki; each segment is compelling and instructive in its own way. Taken together they present a cogent portrait of the terrorist, his influence on a very small, but dangerous, segment of the Muslim community, and offer some insights into what we should be looking for as keep watch for the emergence of the “next” Awlaki, whether that person adheres to a form of radical Islam or any other extremist creed.
Like many extremists, and especially religiously-motived extremists, Awlaki had a strong fundamentalist strain in his thinking and approach to religious texts and ideas, and like many extremists, his understanding of these materials often omitted centuries of scholarly and theological interpretation that have given rise to the mainstream versions of major religions which the majority of adherents practice today, regardless of their particular faith. As the author notes, this put him, to some extent, in the camp of the Salafists, whose approach to Islam is predicated upon the belief that, “ … only the Koran, the Hadith collections, and the consensus of Muhammad’s companions can be relied upon as authentic sources of Islamic knowledge and that a literal interpretation of these texts is all that Muslims require to understand their faith, regardless of time or context” (49). The author makes it clear that not all Salafists (or fundamentalists, for that matter) are extremists, and not all extremists are violent, but this insight into Alwaki’s foundational approach to Islam, and to the world, is certainly instructive in terms of understanding how he came to embrace the violent worldview he did, and the related messages he spread so effectively around the world.
Although he seems to have lacked serious bona fides as an Islamic scholar, Awlaki nonetheless managed to become a fairly popular preacher and, as the author makes clear, he was possessed of an innate ability to develop and disseminate a narrative that resonated with existing and would-be terrorists. The narrative he developed and distributed was one based on a literalist understanding of foundational Islamic texts combined with current events, and allowed him to create frames and stories that appealed to individuals who fit the mold of those often ripe for radicalization: people seeking a sense of meaning and identity in a world where few options seem to fit or appeal to them. Going one step further, beyond radicalization, Awlaki’s words appealed to those who were, in a number of critical cases, willing to take a step beyond extremist ideology into the world of extremist action in the form of violence against “the other.”
Meleagrou-Hitchens notes two of the most important factors essential to Awalki’s success in this area; first, he knew his audience, and second, like generations of terrorist before him, he embraced the concept of “Propaganda by the Deed,” an early terrorist concept pioneered by Italian anarchist Carlo Pisacane, which is centered on the notion that violence itself plays a critical role in awakening the consciousness of both individuals and societies when it comes to sparking political consciousness and eventually violence in the furtherance of a political program. As the author notes, “Similar to the ‘contagion’ phenomenon seen with mass shootings, he hoped that as more attacks were carried out, more jihadist sympathizers would be inspired to follow suit,” later adding that, “Awlaki pursued a variety of frame alignment strategies that ensured that his arguments would resonate with his intended audience”(159).
As with many of the essential elements of his actions, Awlaki was not particularly original in his embrace and use of the concept of “Propaganda by the Deed,” but his ability to read the landscape and understand what his followers were looking for does put him in a slightly different category than the majority of terrorist handlers who are often more focused on a close coterie of followers and individual acts of terror, as opposed to a broader message designed to attract and activate individuals from across a broad geographical swath. One of the important services this book renders is that it makes clear that it was in part this dual role, as both ideologue and operative, that made Awlaki such a threat to the West.
In the second half of the book, Meleagrou-Hitchens delves into the lives of three individuals, Umar Farouk Adbulmutallab (the so-called “Underwear Bomber”), former US Army psychiatrist Nidal Hasan, and Zachary Adam Chesser, all of whom were inspired by Awlaki’s message of violent jihad such that they were moved to take action themselves. The case of Chesser, who seems to have gone through his own radicalization process almost entirely online, offers some important insights for those engaged in the work of trying to divert individuals from the path of violent extremism. Awalki’s embrace of digital media not only allowed a large audience to consume his message, it also essentially gave his work ever-lasting life online where individuals such as Chesser could find, absorb, and regurgitate it, perpetuating the spread and cycle of online radicalization. For Islamist terrorist propagandists such as Chesser and others, it is important to note that Awlaki was an example for them not only in content but in form. Awlaki offered a structural template for others to follow, allowing both the master and his disciples to spread the message of violent jihad far and wide online with few, if any, impediments. As Melegraou-Hitchens notes, “By the time he was arrested in late July 2010, Chesser had signed up to approximately six jihadist forums; had created three YouTube profiles, two Twitter accounts, and a Facebook profile that were used to spread jihadi propaganda; and had built two online blogs calling for a global jihadist revolution.” He notes further that, “As well as using multiple online platforms to disseminate the work of Awalki and other global jihadist groups and individuals, Chesser also produced original output. A large portion of this drew heavily from Awlaki’s work” (211).
In this example, the author makes it clear why we should not merely be aware of, but study the methods and legacy of Awlaki. In a world in which digital content has a seemingly eternal shelf-life and future generations of violent extremists are likely to be equally, if not more, savvy with respect to the use of online platforms, it seems apparent that the most likely opportunities for early detection and perhaps interruption will be in the digital world. This is both good and bad news; good because it may mean more opportunities for disruption, bad because in the vast electronic sea we all now only swim, but rely, there are more predators among the waves than ever.
Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. J. M. Berger, Extremism (The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States of America, 2018).
Comments