By Daniel E. Levenson, Democracy and Security, Volume 17, 2021- Issue 1 https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2021.1875305
One of the primary challenges that those who study and practice counterterrorism face is the notion that the concept of “terrorism” itself defies agreement on a consensus definition. Further muddying the waters is an endless parade of television “experts” and talking heads, who continue to perpetuate the notion that despite the long history of the subject, and the intense focus it has drawn in recent decades, that the concept of “terrorism” itself uniquely defies definition, or at least is at the center of a constant and particularly thorny epistemological debate destined to carry on ad infinitum. Making matters worse, this idea that terrorism cannot be defined has grown roots in the media, as well as more broadly in general discourse within the public sphere, sometimes pushing politicians and policymakers to take actions which are not only misguided and potentially unnecessarily injurious to civil liberties, but of questionable practical value when it comes to counterterrorism. Such confusion and contention are of course not merely matters for intellectual debate. When we talk about terrorism we are talking about a particularly destructive form of political violence, and while context and intent may inform how we view any particular event, physical violence of any kind, whether affective and impromptu, or carefully planned and plotted to achieve some ideological goal, is never abstract for those who are targeted.
Fortunately for the practitioners, policy makers, academics and journalists focused on terrorism, as well as the general public who depend on such experts to mitigate and explain the actions of terrorists, we now have The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths, in which authors Darren Hudson, Arie Perliger, Riley Post, and Zachary Hohman address critical misperceptions about what drives terrorist entities and actors, providing their readers with a text that is accessible, compelling, and likely to find a permanent place on the bookshelves of serious students and scholars of terrorism. Most importantly, the structure of the book, in which the authors present and subsequently deconstruct common misperceptions surrounding terrorists and their actions, goes beyond simply putting the lie to tired tropes and media stereotypes, delving into the reasons behind such misapprehensions, exploring the psychological and social reasons they persist, even in the face of evidence to the contrary. They do not shy away from the issue mentioned above, noting adroitly that when it comes to intersection of risk tolerance, media, government messaging, and terrorism, “The problem here is not that people are risk-averse, or even that we often misunderstand the actual risk of terrorism (both interesting issues) worthy of investigation. Rather, the problem in this context arises when government, media, and other information sources manipulate our natural reaction to risk to their benefit” (pp.100–101).
The authors address these malformed and occasionally malignant misperceptions as a surgeon might seek to remove dead tissue from a gangrenous wound, avoiding the viable, living parts, while endeavoring to excise that which left unattended threatens to disfigure and warp the whole. They do so by taking their time to show how certain oft-repeated ideas about terrorism are not so much backward or the opposite of the truth, but instead reflect a related concept or notion that has found its way into the dialogue in a twisted form, then adopted, repeated, and amplified by influential voices to the point where they have been accepted as truth, regardless of the speaker’s actual depth of knowledge on the topic, or the lack of data which might validate their assertions. The end result is that we find ourselves in a world in which we have unconsciously accepted ideas about “terrorists” or “terrorism” which have become imbued with the implied veracity of abiding and incontrovertible truth, when the reality is far more complicated.
Perhaps one of the most important myths the authors tackle is the psychologically comforting, yet erroneous, concept that terrorism is the result of mental illness either on the part of individuals or as a result of some kind of mass psychosis within a terrorist organization, when in fact, as they and other scholars have demonstrated, the use of violence to advance a political or ideological agenda is neither necessarily wholly irrational, or uncommon. In many ways this mistaken belief is of course understandable – after all, for most people it is hard to imagine why any sane person would engage in the murder of strangers, let alone innocent civilians including children, to advance a political agenda. Nonetheless, this is perhaps one of the most enduring myths relating to terrorism, with Hollywood and the media providing consumers with a steady diet of maniacal gunmen and mad bombers, and as the authors of this book note, there is a perfectly rational reason that audiences continue to buy into this flawed narrative, writing, “Defining terrorists as ‘crazy’ is appealing, as explaining why a person willingly flew a plane into a building, killing thousands of people, is much easier if he suffered from some mental disorder. It is significantly more troubling to consider that a ‘normal’ person took a calculated and rational approach to mass murder” (p.65). The implication is that if mass media tackled this topic by showing that for the vast majority of terrorist actors the decision to use violence was arrived at in a logical (if immoral) process, it would likely be both profoundly unnerving for journalists and media consumers alike, not to mention a failure at the box office
In the case of mental health and terrorism, the authors follow this relatively simple, but powerful, statement regarding the difficulty of comprehending terrorism as a rational choice which is not rooted in insanity, with a discussion of the origins of the idea that terrorists are all “crazy,” and, importantly, a discussion of the role of mental health and psychology may actually play in terrorism. For example, they highlight ways in which terrorist leaders use concepts relating to a potential recruits search for psychological safety and the ways that these groups use this as a tool to attract and retain new members, noting that, “Feelings of social uncertainty motivate people to identify with social groups which are best at reducing, controlling or protecting against feelings of uncertainty. Terrorist groups are particularly good at reducing uncertainty … ” (p.78).
This observation on the part of the authors with regard to the intersection of mental health and terrorism also serves as an excellent example of the kind of accessible approach they take throughout the book as they tackle central myths surrounding terrorism and its relationship to religious fundamentalism, as well as income and educational inequality. Characterized by lucid and insightful descriptions of the ways in which terrorist entities are organized and operate, the authors also present important examples of the ways in which interactions with media and government influence actors on both sides of the equation.
With regard to the role that religious ideology plays with respect to terrorism, the authors importantly highlight that no one religion has a monopoly when it comes to extremist factions or terrorists. Even more importantly, they outline the ways in which what we perceive as “religious” terrorism is often really driven by a political program. In a post-9/11 world where myths and stereotypes have led to widespread misunderstanding of both the phenomenon of terrorism as well as the role that religion does play with regard to terrorism, such an understanding is vital for both those engaged in counterterrorism work as well as the general public. Without discounting the role that religious ideology can play in extremist violence, as the authors note succinctly, “ … using a holy text does not make a group nonpolitical” (p.30). With this key concept in mind, they then proceed to artfully deconstruct a number of high profile terrorist entities and incidents tied to religiously oriented agendas, from the Hezbollah vehicle bomb attacks on US and French forces in Lebanon in 1983, to the strategy and tactics of Boko Haram in Nigeria, where despite connections to Islamist ideology there is abundant evidence that these actions also reflect political and irredentist agendas playing out. As they do with terrorism and mental health, the authors deserve credit here with their nuanced examination of the ways in which religion and terrorism do intersect, including as a rallying cry and organizing principle among global Jihadist entities, and among far-right violent extremist movements in the United States, noting that while religious fundamentalism does not directly cause terrorism, it can serve as a powerful inspiration for some individuals who engage in terrorism.
There is little question that the authors have done their homework, are experts in the field, and provide a comprehensive list of relevant resources. At the same time, one area where the authors might have expanded, and which might lend itself to a second, companion volume, would be to provide the reader with some more in-depth case studies of the entities and incidents discussed in the book. With its clear prose and timeliness, this book could easily be two or three times its present length, and still serve as a valuable introduction to the topic of terrorist motivations and operations, as well as an important reference for researchers. It would also allow for the expansion of chapters on some of the more compelling topics they explore, such as the difference between perceived and actual connections between religious extremist ideology and terrorism.
The authors conclude with an examination of myths relating to counterterrorism in which they consider the ways in which this field, obviously inextricably linked to terrorism itself, is also rife with misperception and confusion. Throughout this work they draw the readers’ attention, both implicitly and explicitly, to the fact that terrorist organizations, especially those which have achieved some degree of longevity (as opposed to the majority which form and then dissipate in a year or less) demonstrate a level of internal complexity that looks more like what one would expect to find inside a successful multinational corporation, than the rag-tag group of crazed gunmen running around the desert that Hollywood often simplistically resorts to in the portrayal of “terrorist bad guys.” As such, they reveal one potential weakness that counterterrorism practitioners can exploit: namely, that just like any complex, multi-level organization with many moving parts, there are bound to be a wide range of personalities, attitudes, and skill levels among the different sections and personnel. Some will invariably be stronger than others, and within the difference in individual motivations lie weak points in the armor of the terrorist entity – this means the individual terrorists might be more easily detected, diverted, or turned against their own organization than others, and that on a slightly larger scale, certain operational or logistical subsections which may not be as competent as the others may be ripe for the same.
In other words, the authors demonstrate that it is not necessarily the case that one has to attack every aspect and operative of an organization in order to develop an effective counterterrorism program. Just as one might do with efforts to frustrate the actions of an organized crime enterprise, it would seem logical instead that instead of trying to arrest every single person involved, from the head of the organized crime group to the people transporting the product to the corrupt customs agent down to the individual who sells illicit items on the street, rather, to look for the weak point in the entity or the process, and from there begin to map and exploit related weaknesses, gaining knowledge about the group and disrupting its activities one step at a time.
Finally, it is worth noting that the authors have done both their readers, and the field as a whole, an important service by placing the issue of terrorism squarely in the field of political violence. That they do so without ignoring the ties and relationships that economics, education, psychology, and other relevant fields play in developing a holistic understanding of this phenomenon is doubly to their credit. The study of terrorism is undoubtedly a field that has evolved significantly over time, and arguably requires those who make its study their life’s work, and endeavor to do so responsibly, to gain a decent working knowledge of the aforementioned fields. At the same time, the authors of The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Myths make a clear and compelling argument in their book that at the center of this work lies the idea that terrorism is in some way a form of political violence that functions like a commodity, subject to principles of both supply and demand within a society, reflecting the frustrations, desires, and actions of both governments and the general public.
This may strike the general reader (and perhaps even some professionals) as a rather cold, calculating, way of looking at a process that target institutions, both quotidian and grand, killing and maiming innocent people. However, it is the kind of clear-eyed approach, devoid of emotion, that can serve as an antidote to the hyperbolic, fear-mongering language which all too often characterizes dialogue on the issue. At the end of the book the authors bring their work full circle, stating their desire that the reader has gained a better understanding of the complexities involved in the phenomena of terrorism, and that they will judge the success of the book by this standard. Fortunately for all of us, with their accessible and engaging style there is little question that they have indeed achieved this goal.
Copyright Daniel E. Levenson 2021.
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